OATAO is an open access repository that collects the work of Toulouse researchers and makes it freely available over the web where possible Abstract. The aim of this paper is to define the counterpart of separable belief functions for capacities valued on a finite totally ordered set. Evidence theory deals with the issue of merging unreliable elementary testimonies. Separable belief functions are the results of this merging process. However not all belief functions are separable. Here, we start with a possibility distribution on the power set of a frame of discernment that plays the role of a basic probability assignment. It turns out that any capacity can be induced by the qualitative counterpart of the definition of a belief function (replacing sum by max). Then, we consider a qualitative counterpart of Dempster rule of combination applied to qualitative capacities, via their qualitative Möbius transforms. We study the class of capacities, called separable capacities, that can be generated by applying this combination rule to simple support capacities, each focusing on a subset of the frame of discernment. We compare this decomposition with the one of general capacities as a maximum over a finite set of necessity measures. The relevance of this framework to the problem of information fusion from unreliable sources is explained.
Introduction
Shafer's evidence theory [21] essentially deals with the fusion of information items stemming from several more or less reliable testimonies (or sources). In their most basic forms, these unreliable information items take the form of subsets of a frame of discernment (supposed to contain the value of the parameter of interest) along with weights representing the extent to which the testimonies are credible. Shafer uses as a mathematical model a positive probability distribution, called basic probability assignment, over a family of subsets said to be focal. The total quantity of belief in a particular subset is represented by the belief function and the Möbius transform allows to recover the basic probability assignment from the belief function in a univocal manner.
In this paper we focus on the representation and the management of uncertainty in information of non quantitative nature. Indeed much knowledge is qualitative, often expressed verbally or diagrammatically. We are interested in the qualitative counterpart of Shafer's evidence theory [21] , where the basic probability assignment is turned into a basic possibility assignment whose weights have 1 as maximum. This idea of a basic possibility assignment dates back to a suggestion made in [12, 13] . Since then, some authors have been interested by this qualitative counterpart. For example, we can mention the papers [1, 2, 15, 25] . In [15] , any monotonic set function (also called fuzzy measure [24] ) is shown to be equal to the maximum of necessity measures and to the minimum of possibility measures. In [25] , upper and lower possibilities and necessities are expressed in terms of basic possibility assignments or of necessity assignments. The interest of such possibility assignments have been already suggested in the context of information fusion [1] .
We consider a set of sources informing about the value of a parameter x of interest. Each source delivers a proposition of the form x ∈ A, where A is a subset of a frame of discernment Ω. An associated weight σ(A), belonging to a symbolic totally ordered scale, reflects the credibility of this elementary testimony. This is modelled by a basic possibility assignment whose weights are such that -σ(A) < 1 (where 1 is the top of the scale) if A differs from Ω; -σ(Ω) = 1 (under this condition, σ is said to be non-dogmatic); -σ(B) = 0 for B = A, Ω otherwise.
Mind that σ(B) = 0 refers to the absence of support in favor of B (not its impossibility), and the greater σ(A), the greater the support in favor of A. In other words σ is formally a possibility assignment because it is normalized in the sense of a possibility distribution, but its semantics is not exactly in agreement with possibility theory. A mapping σ is also the qualitative counterpart of the basic probability assignment of a simple support belief function. In this paper we consider fuzzy measures obtained from the qualitative merging of such unreliable elementary testimonies.
In the numerical setting, simple support functions are important in Shafer's theory as they model unreliable elementary testimonies, the fusion of which (using Dempster rule of combination) yields so-called separable belief functions. Here we study the qualitative counterpart of separable belief functions (introduced in [6] ). Namely we give necessary and sufficient conditions under which a fuzzy measure can be decomposed in terms of unreliable testimonies, and check whether this decomposition is unique. Moreover we start discussing the relevance of this framework for information fusion. In many situations such as risk analysis, experts express their knowledge about the likelihood of dreadful events verbally, and these terms are then translated into numbers on a probability scale. This paper starts an investigation on the possibility of directly expressing and merging qualitative information of this kind.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, basic possibility assignments and their combination by means of a qualitative counterpart of Dempster rule of combination are recalled. In Sect. 3 we apply these notions to the combination of non-dogmatic capacities via their qualitative Möbius transforms. Section 4 lays bare the class of separable qualitative capacities that are the result of combining, by means of the qualitative Dempster rule, non-dogmatic necessity functions induced by their focal sets. This combination is compared to the decomposition of any capacity as a maximum of necessity functions. We show that any capacity has a separable approximation that dominates it. Section 5 applies these results to the fusion of unreliable testimonies. It bridges the gap with Belnap set-ups for inconsistent information handling and his 4-valued logic on the one hand, and the method of maximal consistent subsets on the other hand.
Framework and Notations
In evidence theory, a basic probability assignment m is used, which is a probability distribution over the power set of Ω, such that m(∅) = 0. A belief function Bel(A) = ∅ =B⊆A m(B), which represents the total quantity of belief in the subset A of Ω, is associated with only one mass function m computed from Bel using the Möbius transform.
Basic Possibility Assignments
Let L be a totally ordered scale with a bottom 0 and a top 1. Given a frame of discernment Ω, information is represented by means of a mapping σ, called basic possibility assignment, from 2 Ω to L such that max A⊆Ω σ(A) = 1 (top normalization). If we stick to Shafer's view, the σ function should reflect a set of unreliable testimonies, whereby each claim of the form x ∈ A is weighted by σ(A).
In this paper, in agreement with Shafer theory, we assume bottom-normal possibility assignments, i.e., σ(∅) = 0. Similarly to Shafer theory, a basic possibility assignment σ defines the following set function:
Note that Bel pos (∅) = 0, Bel pos (Ω) = 1. It was very early pointed out [13] that the set function Bel pos can be any fuzzy measure or capacity, that is a monotonic set function v on Ω, such that v(A) ≥ v(B) whenever B ⊆ A. Conversely, any fuzzy measure v can be put in the form v(A) = max B⊆A σ(B) for a basic possibility assignment σ. In particular, the qualitative Möbius transform [9, 18] of a fuzzy measure v is defined as follows: 
Example 1. Consider a Boolean capacity v with range in {0, 1} and its qualitative Möbius transform v * .
Clearly, we have v(A) = max B⊆A v * (B). Like in evidence theory, the sets A such that v * (A) > 0 are called focal sets. Note that for all focal sets A and B such that B ⊂ A we have v * (B) < v * (A). The focal set A can be viewed as the minimal set in the sense of inclusion with weight v(A). Like in evidence theory, a capacity v is said to be non-dogmatic if Ω is a focal set of v, i.e., v * (Ω) = 1 (indeed, 0 < v * (Ω) < 1 is forbidden, since then v * (A) < 1, ∀A ⊆ Ω, which would imply v(Ω) < 1).
The unicity of the basic probability assignment generating a belief function is no longer satisfied in the qualitative setting as several basic possibility assignments σ may yield the same capacity v such that v(A) = max B⊆A σ(B). There is actually a whole family of set functions (basic possibility assignments) generating v, namely: Remark 1. In a counterpart of Dempster's approach [7] , the σ function is the result of mapping a set U equipped with a possibility distribution π to the set Ω via a multivalued mapping Γ : U → 2 Ω , whereby σ(A) = max Γ (u)=A π(u) [13] . The understanding of Γ is as follows: each value u ∈ U is compatible with and only with some value w ∈ Γ (u). Considering a selection function f :
. In other words, the imprecision due to Γ yields an imprecise possibility measure. The peculiarity of Dempster-like upper and lower possibilities is that a "lower possibility" is just any capacity, while an "upper possibility" is just a possibility measure, contrary to the quantitative case, where it is a more general set function. An upper possibility is the possibility measure whose possibility distribution is the contour function π v (w) = max w∈E v * (E) of v = Bel pos . So, P l pos is not the conjugate of Bel pos (i.e., P l pos (A) = 1 − Bel pos (A c ), for the complement A c of A). In the qualitative setting there is a disconnection between the notion of conjugate and the definition of the upper possibility. This is explained in more details in [15] . The Dempster approach to qualitative possibility can be viewed as defining imprecise possibilities, and it encompasses standard possibilistic representations as a particular case. This view of capacities as lower possibilities is at odds with the framework of our paper, where a capacity is a kind of measure of support.
Dempster-Like Combination of Basic Possibilistic Assignments
In Shafer's evidence theory, the well-known Dempster rule of combination [21] has a counterpart in our qualitative maxitive setting first suggested in [19] : Definition 2. Let σ 1 and σ 2 be two basic possibility assignments. The conjunctive combination rule is defined by
However the conjunctive combination of equivalent basic possibility assignments (generating the same fuzzy measure) may not yield equivalent basic possibility assignments:
The set function σ 1 ⊗ σ 2 is generally not even a basic possibility assignment because σ 1 ⊗ σ 2 induces a monotonic set-function such that (σ 1 ⊗ σ 2 )(∅) = 0 may occur. We may even get (σ 1 ⊗ σ 2 )(∅) = 1 if the two possibility distributions σ 1 and σ 2 bear on disjoint subsets, which makes the combination ineffective. σ 1 ⊗ σ 2 is thus a basic possibility assignment provided that there does not exist B and C such that B ∩ C = ∅ and σ 1 (B) > 0, σ 2 (C) > 0.
In order to respect the closure property for this combination rule, we can, in conformity with evidence theory, -either consider a more general class of monotonic set functions than capacities whereby v(∅) > 0 is allowed. However it is not clear what it means. -or modify the combination rule by bottom-renormalizing the result.
In [6] , the bottom normalization condition (σ 1 ⊗ σ 2 )(∅) = 0 is enforced and added to Definition 2. In the following of the paper we use this bottomnormalized conjunctive rule denoted by⊗. 
The bottom-normalized combination rule is commutative; it possesses an identity: the vacuous basic possibilistic assignment σ 0 , equal to 0 everywhere except on Ω (σ 0 ⊗ σ = σ for all σ); it is associative (even if not proved in [6] ):
However, the consequence of this new definition is that we may fail to preserve top-normalization via combination, when there are no B and C such that σ 1 (B) = σ 2 (C) = 1 with B ∩ C = ∅. Moreover, if the two possibility distributions σ 1 and σ 2 bear on disjoint subsets, we may even have (σ 1⊗ σ 2 )(A) = 0 for all A = ∅. This inconvenient does not appear if we restrict to basic possibilistic assignments such σ(Ω) = 1, generating non-dogmatic fuzzy measures, which we shall assume in the sequel.
Conjunctive Combination of Qualitative Capacities
In the following, we shall apply the combination rule to non-dogmatic capacities v via their Möbius transforms. Let us start with simple support capacities. The definition of simple support functions present in the Dempster Shafer theory can be adapted to the qualitative setting.
simple support function (SSF) focused on a set S if and only if
An SSF focused on S is non-dogmatic and is clearly a necessity measure we denote by N S . The qualitative Möbius transform of such a simple support function N S is a basic possibility assignment of the form:
Consider two simple support functions (SSFs) N A and N B where the focal set weights are respectively N A * (A) = α ≥ N B * (B) = β. Then the result of the combination N A * ⊗ N B * is a basic possibility assignment σ AB such that
The combination of Möbius transforms is not necessarily a Möbius transform as the resulting capacity v AB does not have focal set B if A ∩ B = ∅ and α > β. This capacity v AB thus has focal sets that depend upon A, B, α, β:
The result of the conjunctive combination rules depend on the basic possibility assignments used to represent the capacity. If we combine possibilistic basic assignments σ 1 , σ 2 that respectively generate capacities v 1 and v 2 and that differ from the Möbius transforms, the result of the combination will be different if we use σ 1 , σ 2 and if we use Möbius transforms, as already seen in Example 2. 
If we define the conjunctive combination of two capacities via operation⊗ applied to their Möbius transforms, this lack of invariance of the combination rule for equivalent basic possibility assignments entails the following consequence: when combining v 1 , v 2 , v 3 as (i) first obtaining v 12 from the basic possibilistic assignment v 1 * ⊗ v 2 * , then (ii) combining v 12 and v 3 by computing v 12 * ⊗ v 3 * , the result may differ from the capacity derived from σ 123 = (v 1 * ⊗ v 2 * )⊗v 3 * , since
This state of facts forces us to define the conjunctive combination of more than two (say k) capacities v i by combining their Möbius transforms via Definition 2 in one step, avoiding the issues of associativity and lack of stability with respect to ∼. 
and the resulting capacity v(
A) = max E⊆A σ⊗(E) is denoted by v =⊗ k i=1 v i . We then call (v 1 , . . . , v n ) a conjunctive decomposition of v.
Separable Non-dogmatic Capacities
A capacity v is said to be separable if and only if v =⊗ k i=1 N S i for some SSFs. Note that in this case, v is non-dogmatic since Ω is a focal set. Each SSFs is viewed as a testimony of the form x is S i whose reliability is measured by α i .
Characterization of Separability
In the previous section, it can be seen that the capacity obtained by merging two SSFs respectively focused on sets A and B is such that it has at most three focal sets and each pair of such focal sets is either nested (e.g., A ∩ B and A) or disjoint (e.g., A and B if disjoint). This property holds when merging more than two SSF's and is formally expressed as follows.
Definition 6. A family of sets F is said to be disjoint-nested if and only if the following condition holds
We can now formulate the main result of the paper: The structure of the set of focal sets of a separable capacity is very peculiar. Going top down, Ω is focal with degree 1. Then we may have disjoint focal sets, each containing a nested sequence of focal sets. In each sequence, the smallest set may also contain disjoint focal sets, and so on, recursively. In other words, for any focal set A, the set of focal sets B that contain A (if any) forms a chain of nested sets, which is another way to express the necessary and sufficient condition (2) for a capacity to be separable. Numerical belief functions with disjoint-nested focal sets have been studied in the literature. Walley [26] showed that they are the only ones whose combination is in agreement with the likelihood principle. They are also studied by Giang and Shenoy [16] in the framework of dynamic decision under uncertainty.
Non-separable Capacities
As shown in [15] , each qualitative capacity v is the maximum of necessity measures:
. This decomposition is different from the one defined by the separability property using⊗. However they coincide for separable capacities.
Proposition 1. A capacity v is separable if and only if
Contrary to the numerical case of separable belief functions, the separability of a capacity v does not impose that the family of focal sets F v is closed under intersection. For instance, the non-dogmatic capacity with focals such that v * (A) = α > v * (B) = β > v * (A ∩ B) = γ is not separable as⊗(N A , N B , N A∩B ) since the latter is the necessity measure N with N * (A) = α, N * (A ∩ B) = β (indeed σ⊗(A ∩ B) = β, obtained by combining A with weight α, B with weight β and Ω from N A∩B ). Note that N > v. This property holds for all non-separable capacities.
Proposition 2. Suppose v is not separable, and letv
Proof.v is a separable capacity whose family of focal sets Fv contains only some non-empty intersections of focal sets of v. We have, for A = ∅,
It is clear that σ⊗(
So, each non-decomposable capacity possesses a separable upper approximation.
Examples of Separable Capacities
It is clear that non-dogmatic necessity measures N are separable since F N is nested. Likewise, capacities whose set of focal sets contains only disjoint subsets, on top of Ω, are separable. Note that possibility measures are not separable because they are dogmatic since their focal sets are all singletons. However, nondogmatic capacities v π whose focal sets are singletons but for Ω are separable. Namely, there exists a subnormal possibility distribution π (max w∈Ω π(w) < 1), such that v π is defined by v π (A) = Π(A), A = Ω, and 1 otherwise. v π is called a pseudo-possibility measure and is such that
Dually, the conjugate of a pseudo-possibility measure is a capacity such that v(A ∩ B) = min(v(A), v(B)) whenever A ∩ B = ∅, which can be called a pseudonecessity measure. 
Its focal sets are thus {Ω,
They are disjoint-nested, i.e., clearly satisfy the separability condition (2).
Corollary 1. A pseudo-necessity function is separable.
But not all separable capacities take this form, since pseudo-necessities must have only one nontrivial chain of non-singleton focal sets.
Example 4. The non-dogmatic capacity v with v(E
Consider a set of k sources, each delivering a piece of information about an entity x in the form of a statement x ∈ S i ⊂ Ω, one can view as a testimony. The receiver may attach a weight α i to each source i, which assesses confidence in the truth of statement x ∈ S i . We assume no source is fully reliable (i.e., α i < 1, i = 1, . . . , k), nor irrelevant (i.e., α i > 0, i = 1, . . . , k) .
Formally, this body of evidence can be viewed as a basic possibility assignment
Non-destructive vs. Destructive Merging
The capacity v induced by σ as v(A) = max B⊆A σ(B) is non-dogmatic and achieves a representation of the set of testimonies where redundant sources are eliminated. A source i is redundant when there is j = i such that S j ⊆ S i and α i ≤ α j . We can write v as v = max
The focal sets of v other than Ω are the set S i corresponding to sources that are not redundant. Note that the condition α i < 1 is not imperative here as all capacities, including dogmatic ones take the form v = max This process can be viewed as a non-destructive fusion operation, as information items from all non-redundant sources are preserved.
In contrast, if we compute possibility distributions
where ν is the order-reversing map on L, the usual fusion process in possibility theory would consist in computing π ∧ = min k i=1 π i , and then obtaining the necessity measure N (A) = ν(max w ∈A π ∧ (w)) = min w ∈A max i:w ∈S i α i . However, it is very likely that π ∧ will be subnormalized, and that a large part of the information supplied by the sources is lost. In that case, the alternative fusion method is disjunctive, and computes π ∨ = max k i=1 π i , which comes down to computing the necessity measure min
Again the result is getting rid of source information, and may considerably increase ignorance. For instance, in the case of two conflicting sources S 1 , S 2 , such that α 2 ) ) and π ∨ (w) = 1, ∀w ∈ S 1 ∪ S 2 . The two pieces of information are destroyed by these fusion operations while they can be retrieved from v. This kind of (usual) fusion process is thus destructive.
Connection with Belnap Logic
Computing the capacity value v(A) from a basic possibility assignment for all subsets A is similar to the inconsistent information management set-ups in Belnap logic [3] . In this approach, sources supply information, and each one declares each atomic proposition p j , j = 1, . . . q of a language as true, false or unknown. Overall, each such atomic proposition is attached a value t(p j ) ∈ {T, F, N, B} summarizing what sources said about p j , and providing the epistemic status of atomic propositions:
if at least one source declared p j true and none declared it false, F if at least one source declared p j false and none declared it true, N if no source declared p j true nor false, B if at least one source declared p j true and one declared it false, The values N, T, F, B respectively stand for "None, True, False, Both". The epistemic status of other propositions built from the atomic propositions p j 's is then obtained using 4-valued truth tables [4] . The set of values {T, F, N, B} forms a bilattice, i.e., is equipped with two ordering relations: the information ordering < I such that N < I T < I B and N < I F < I B, expressing the idea of being less informed, and the truth-ordering < t such that F < t N < t T and F < t B < t T , expressing the idea of being less true (in fact, less credible, here).
This framework has been extended in [5] to the case where any kind of information can be supplied by sources, in the form x ∈ S i ⊂ Ω, using 0-1 capacities. Namely, we can build the Boolean (in particular, dogmatic) capacity v such that v = max The truth-ordering < t can be extended by requiring that the opinion of sources about A be less positive than the opinion about B, which can be formalized as:
. This is a partial ordering on graded pairs. The structure (L ⊗ L, ≤ I , ≤ t ) is a double partially ordered set that extends the bilattice structure of Belnap. It is a lattice with the disjunction (a, a
. And also another lattice with operations (a, a
; there is also a negation that consists of switching v(A) and v(A c ) (which reminds of intuitionistic fuzzy sets); see [8] for algebraic considerations of such extended bilattices.
The Maximal Consistent Subsets Approach
The non-destructive approach to information fusion only collects information items supplied by sources, in the spirit of Belnap information processor, without trying to cross-fertilize them. In particular, if source 1 says x ∈ S 1 and source 2 says x ∈ S 2 , we still have v(
2 ) = 0, that is, as receivers, we do not conclude x ∈ S 1 ∩ S 2 . However, many fusion methods assume we can make this step unless S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅: it is a basic fusion principle in logic [20] and uncertainty theories [14] . This view can be captured if we push the previous non-destructive merging further, by constructingv =⊗ k i=1 N S i , a non-dogmatic separable capacity, which presupposes α i < 1, ∀i.
This idea was briefly proposed in [1] , where consistent subsets of pieces of information obtained from subsets of sources are combined, forming a lattice of arguments where the results are attached to set of sources whose credibility can be taken into account. Considering maximal subsets of consistent sources K j , j = 1, . . . p, each K j yields a nested family of focal sets ofv. Namely suppose K j = {S j 1 , . . . , S j n j }, with α j 1 > · · · > α j n j , then the sets S j 1 , S j 1 ∩ S j 2 , . . . , ∩ n j ℓ=1 S j ℓ are focal sets ofv, with respective weights α j 1 > · · · > α j n j . There are p such chains in Fv. Again we can compare the epistemic statuses of propositions x ∈ A from the information provided from sources after cross-checking, by applying the information and the truth orderings to pairs (
, as examplified in Example 5 and in Table 1 , and already proved by Proposition 2. Using the first approach defines a capacity that has these 4 focal sets plus [1, 6] . Using the second approach, the maximal consistent subsets are Table 1 compares the two approaches via pairs (v(A), v(A c )): note that precise information items, rejected by the non-destructive approach become conflicting under the conjunctive one. But regarding {2, 5}, the conjunctive combination restores consistency where the non-destructive approach is ignorant.
Example 6. Finally we can consider a qualitative counterpart of the famous Peter, Paul and Mary case after Smets [23] . A crime has been committed and Table 2 . The Peter, Paul and Mary case vv vv vv ({P a}, {P e, M a}) (0, α) (α, α) ({P e}, {P a, M a}) (0, β) (0, β) ({M a}, {P e, P a}) (α, α) (α, α) the killer is known to be among Peter, Paul and Mary. There are three pieces of evidence. One source claims the killer is a male (with weight α) and another source claims it is a female (with the same weight α). Finally, another source claims that Peter has an alibi (with stronger confidence β > α). So we first define the capacity v on {P e, P a, M a} such that v * ({P e, P a}) = v * ({M a}) = α, and v * ({M a, P a}) = β. Now let us combine these information items and get the separable upper approximationv of v. Its Moebius transform is the same as the one of v but forv * (P a) = α = min(v * ({M a, P a}), v * ({P e, P a}). See Table 2 . While, as expected, Peter is considered the least credible killer, v seems to exonerate Paul against Mary (even if information concerning her is just contradictory), whilev puts Mary and Paul back on a par.
Conclusion
This paper has explored some formal similarities between belief functions and qualitative capacities, initiated in [15, 19] , by studying the counterparts of separable belief functions in relation with information fusion problems. We have focused on the merging of uncertain qualitative testimonies. We have shown that the qualitative counterpart of Dempster rule of combination applied to uncertain qualitative testimonies leads to separable capacities whose focal sets are either disjoint or nested. This notion of separability turns out to be more drastic than in the numerical setting for belief functions. Indeed, Shafer [21] has shown that the set of focal sets of a separable belief function is closed under nonempty intersections, and Smets [22] has shown that any belief function can be obtained by a kind of division between the commonalities of two separable belief functions, leading to interpret them as the fusion of both elementary testimonies and prejudices against their conjunctions [11] . In the qualitative case, the set of focal sets of separable capacities does not contain non-nested overlapping sets, so that we cannot reconstruct a non-separable capacity from two separable ones by a kind of subtraction. However, results related to symmetric minimum and maximum [17] suggest a possibility of erasing Möbius weights. Another line of study would be to replace the min and/or max in the qualitative Dempster rule by operations, inducing the leximin and leximax orderings, on multisets obtained from the concatenation of weights [9, 10] . For instance, the combination of N A and N B with respective weights on A and B equal to α and β, would yield focal sets A with weight (α, 1), B with weight (1, β) and A ∩ B with weight (α, β), where (α, β) < (α, 1) and (α, β) < (1, β) in the sense of leximin. This approach may extend the range of separability for capacities.
